Baker Lake and the Concept of Aboriginal Title by Elliott, David W.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 18, Number 4 (December 1980) Article 7
Baker Lake and the Concept of Aboriginal Title
David W. Elliott
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Elliott, David W.. "Baker Lake and the Concept of Aboriginal Title." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 18.4 (1980) : 653-663.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol18/iss4/7
BAKER LAKE AND THE CONCEPT OF
ABORIGINAL TITLE
By DAID W. ELLIOTT*
As a result of Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs,'
aboriginal title2 has come closer to gaining recognition in Canada as a com-
mon law right existing independently of the Royal Proclamation of 1763.3
As several aspects of this decision of the Trial Division of the Federal Court
show, the judicial development of aboriginal title has not been easy and the
concept will face more growing pains in the years to come. Nevertheless,
throughout the decision Mahoney J. makes a serious effort to deal with several
of the unanswered or partly answered questions surrounding aboriginal title.
In doing so he has removed some of the uncertainty clouding this elusive
concept.
The Baker Lake case arose as the result of concerns by the Inuit of the
Baker Lake area 4 of the Northwest Territories that government-licensed ex-
ploration companies were interfering with their aboriginal rights, particularly
their right to hunt caribou.5 They sought relief that included a declaration
0 Copyright, 1980, David W. Elliott.
* Associate Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University.
1[19801 1 F.C. 518, [19791 3 C.N.L.R. 17 (F.C.T.D.). Reasons for judgment de-
livered on November 15, 1979. (Leave to appeal the decision to the Federal Court of
Appeal was not sought.) As well as the Hamlet of Baker Lake, the plaintiffs comprised
the Baker Lake Hunters and Trappers Association; the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada; and 112
individual Inuit who lived, hunted and fished in the Baker Lake area at the time of the
case. The defendants comprised the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop-
ment; certain officers of the Government of Canada responsible under the Minister for
the administration of mining laws in the Northwest Territories; the Attorney General for
Canada; and six mining and mining exploration companies.
2 "The native interest is variously described as 'Indian title,' 'aboriginal title,' 'original
title,' 'native title,' 'right of occupancy,' 'right of possession,' and so on. These terms have
been used more or less interchangeably." See Lysyk, The Indian Title Question in
Canada: An Appraisal in the Light of Calder (1973), 51 Can. Bar Rev. 450 at 450.
Where the term "aboriginal rights" is differentiated from "aboriginal title," aboriginal
rights are regarded as the rights enjoyed pursuant to aboriginal title. Cumming and
Mickenberg, eds., Native Rights in Canada (2d ed. Toronto: General Publ., 1972) at 3n.
3 offered the following definition: "Aboriginal rights [are] those property rights which
inure to native peoples, by virtue of their occupation upon certain lands from time im-
memorial." Cumming, in Native Rights and Law in an Age of Protest (1973), 11 Alta.
L. Rev. 238 at 239, states that: "Aboriginal rights are those property rights which native
peoples retain as a result of their original use and occupancy of lands." The two defini-
tions above might be combined to provide the following, slightly more descriptive
definition: "Aboriginal rights are those property rights that inure to aboriginal peoples by
virtue of their occupation and use of certain lands from time immemorial."
3 Royal Proclamation, 1763 (issued by George III). Reprinted in R.S.C. 1970,
Appendix II at 123.
4 An area of approximately 78,000 square kilometers around the community of
Baker Lake, west of Chesterfield Inlet on the northwest shore of Hudson Bay, in the
District of Keewatin.
5 In The Hamlet of Baker Lake v. The Min. of Ind. Aff. and North. Dev., [1979]
1 F.C. 487, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 342, 7 C.N.L.R. 75 (F.C.T.D.), the forerunner of the 1979
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that the Baker Lake area was subject to an Inuit aboriginal title to hunt and
fish; a declaration that the mining regulations licensing the companies did not
apply to the Baker Lake area; and orders halting the mining activities in the
area.0
Mahoney J. held that the Inuit did have an aboriginal title to most of
the Baker Lake area, but that the rights pursuant to this title could be validly
abridged by legislation.
Finding that Indian aboriginal title law applies prima facie to Inuit,7
Mahoney I. felt compelled by the Sigeareak E1-53 decision8 to determine if
there was a common law basis for the concept of aboriginal title that was
independent of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. He held that there was,
basing the finding on his view that in Calder" "the six members of the Supreme
Court who found it necessary to consider the substantive issues, which dealt
with the territory outside the geographic limits of the Proclamation, all held
that an aboriginal title recognized at common law had existed."' 0
decision, Mahoney J. delivered on April 27, 1978 the reasons for issuing on April 24,
1978 an interim injunction prohibiting the issue of prospecting permits, the grant of
mining leases and the recording of claims under the Canada Mining Regulations,
S.O.R./77-900 and the issue of permits under the Territorial Land Use Regulations,
S.O.R./77-210, in respect of mining exploration and related activities within the Baker
Lake area. The Inuit claimed (in their action for an interim injunction and in the present
litigation) that the activities associated with mineral exploration were interfering with
their ability to hunt the caribou of the area, both on individual occasions and generally,
by driving the caribou away from the area.
6Supra note 1, at 524-25 (F.C.), 20 (C.N.L.R.).
7 Id. at 555 (F.C.), 43 (C.N.L.R.). Mahoney J. gave as his reference for this con-
clusion Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104, [1939] 2 D.L.R. 417. Although Re Eskimos was
a constitutional reference, the Court used broad language there in determining that
Indians includes Eskimos (Inuit), so that Mahoney J.'s qualified inference seems reason-
able. In Sigeareak E1-53 v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 645 at 650, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 536
at 540, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 393 at 397, the Supreme Court had applied the Re Eskimos
interpretation of Indians to a situation involving alleged Inuit rights.
8 Id. In Sigeareak, which involved a charge of abandoning game fit for human con-
sumption in an area of the Northwest Territories not far from the Baker Lake area, the
Supreme Court of Canada stated that:
The Proclamation specifically excludes territory granted to the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany and there can be no question that the region in question was within the area
granted to Hudson's Bay Company. Accordingly the Proclamation does not and
never did apply in the region in question and the judgments to the contrary are not
good law.
Op. cit, at 650 (S.C.R.), 540 (D.L.R.), 397 (C.C.C.).
,9 Calder v. A.G.B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1.
1oSupra note 1, at 556 (F.C.), 43-44 (C.N.L.R.). The six members to whom
Mahoney J. refers here were Judson J. (with whom Martland and Ritchie JJ. agreed) and
Hall J. (with whom Spence and Laskin JJ. agreed). It may be noted that in the view of
Hall J. in Calder, the territory of the Nishgas was not "outside the geographic limits of
the Proclamation." In Hall J.'s view, "tfhe wording of the Proclamation itself seems
quite clear that it was intended to include the lands west of the Rocky Mountains": id.
at 398 (S.C.R.), 206 (D.L.R.), 68 (W.W.R.). Hall J. also regarded the Proclamation as
"a law which followed the flag as England assumed jurisdiction over newly-discovered or
acquired lands or territories": op. cit., at 395 (S.C.R.), 203 (D.L.R.), 65 (W.W.R.).
Hall J. felt that aboriginal title existed independently of the Proclamation (or any other
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This finding seems to attribute to the Supreme Court in Calder a stronger
collective position on the notion of an independent aboriginal title than was
in fact taken. Mahoney J. quoted" the passage in which Judson J. said that
"the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there... .- 12 In this
passage, Judson J. was asserting that the Nishga people were claming in
Calder an aboriginal title independent of the Proclamation.13 Judson J. was
of the view that the case law did not necessarily preclude the existence of
such a title,14 but he did not go so far as to recognize it himself.' 5 His posi-
tion was simply that any aboriginal title which might have existed had since
been extinguished.", If it cannot be said that Judson J. went so far as to
recognize the existence at common law of an independent aboriginal title,
then the Calder decision as a whole is not very strong authority for this
proposition.1
7
treaty, executive order or legislative enactment (op. cit., at 390 (S.C.R.), 200 (D.L.R.),
61 (W.W.R.)) but that the Proclamation could be regarded as "[p]arelleling and sup-
porting" the claim which could be made independently of it: op. cit. at 394 (S.C.R.), 203
D.L.R.), 65 (W.W.R.).
11 Supra note 1, at 556 (F.C.), 44 (C.N.L.R.).
12Supra note 9, at 320 (S.C.R.), 156 (D.L.R.), 11 (W.W.R.):
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot give its
origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the
Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their fore-
fathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not
help one in the solution of this problem to call it a "personal or usufructory right".
What they are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue to live on
their lands as their forefathers had lived and that this right has never been law-
fully extinguished. There can be no question that this right was "dependent on the
goodwill of the Sovereign." [Emphasis added.]
13 See the phrase emphasized in note 12, id.
14 "1 do not take these reasons [the reasons of Lord Watson in the St. Catherine's
Milling case: (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54-55, 4 Cart. B.N.A. 107 at 117-19 (P.C.)]
to mean that the Proclamation was the exclusive source of Indian title": id. at 322
(S.C.R.), 152 (D.L.R.), 7 (W.W.R.).
15 Mahoney J. mentions that Judson and Hall JJ. referred to Worcester v. State of
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 31 U.S. 350 (1832), and speculates that their acceptance of an
aboriginal title arising independently at common law "may well be based upon an
acceptance of the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall" in that decision: supra note 1, at
557 (F.C.), 44 (C.N.L.R.). While there is little doubt that in Worcester (and in
Johnson v. M'Intosh 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 240 (1832)) Chief Justice Marshall saw
aboriginal title as a right recognized at common law independently of the Proclamation,
and while there is little doubt that Hall J. in Calder accepted this reasoning (supra note
9, at 380-86 (S.C.R.), 193-97 (D.L.R.), 53-58 (W.W.R.)) there is no explicit indication
that Judson J. did so. Judson J.'s statement that the Canadian St. Catherine's decisions
were "strongly influenced" by these decisions of Chief Justice Marshall does not
demonstrate this, nor does the passage from Worcester quoted by Judson J. at 321
(S.C.R.), 151 (D.L.R.), 5-6 (W.W.R.).
10 In the concluding part of his judgment, Judson J. stated: "In my opinion, in the
present case, the sovereign authority elected to exercise complete dominion over the
lands in question, adverse to any right of occupancy which the Nishga Tribe might have
had, when, by legislation, it opened up such lands for Indian occupation." Supra note 9,
at 344 (S.C.R.), 167 (D.L.R.), 23 (W.W.R.). [Emphasis added.]
17 Without Judson J. (and Martland and Ritchie JJ.), the proposition would have
the support of only Hall J. (and Spence and Laskin JJ.); three of the seven judges in
Calder (Pigeon J., the seventh judge, based his judgment on a procedural matter unre-
lated to the question of the legal basis of aboriginal title).
1980]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Mahoney J. did note'8 that both Judson and Hall JJ. referred in Calder
to a decision by Marshall C.J. of the United States Supreme Court in
Worcester v. State of Georgia.1 Worcester and Marshall C.J.'s earlier deci-
sion in Johnson v. M'Intosh20 may have been worth pursuing further. In each
of these decisions there are clear assertions that aboriginal title is a right
cognizable at law,21 and these assertions are made independently of references
to the Proclamation."
Had he relied less heavily on Calder, Mahoney J. might have felt com-
pelled to examine cases such as these in greater depth, and to attempt an
analysis of "first principles" regarding the legal basis of aboriginal title,
something long overdue in this area of law. Is aboriginal title capable of inde-
pendent existence in Canadian common law? If so, what are the legal prin-
ciples upon which it is based: common law constitutional rules governing the
acquisition of territory;2 3 prior recognition by the executive or legislative
T8Supra note 1, at 556 (F.C.), 44 (C.N.L.R.).
19 Supra note 15.
20 Id.
21 "[The original inhabitants] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, . . .": Johnson, supra note 15,
at 574 (Wheat.), 253 (U.S.); "[The Indian title of occupancy] is no more incompatible
with a seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might as effectively bar an ejeetment.":
op cit., at 592 (Wheat), 261 (U.S.). "The Indian nations had always been considered
as ... retaining their original rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial, with the single exception [of the restriction on alienation] .... ": Worcester,
supra note 15, at 559 (Pet.), 379 (U.S.).
22 In Johnson, id. at 594 (Wheat.), 262 (U.S.), the Proclamation is referred to as
"an additional objection" (i.e., an objection in addition to the objection based on a
general description of the nature of aboriginal title, a description that stressed both its
legal character and its inability to be alienated except to the government) to the title
asserted by the plaintiffs (a title that they claimed to have obtained by virtue of grants
directly from the Indians); in Worcester, id. at 559 (Pet.), 379 (U.S.) rights which are
said to have existed from "time immemorial" cannot also be attributable solely to the
Proclamation.
23 It looked at first as if counsel for the defendants might succeed in drawing
Mahoney J. into a discussion of the relationship between the rules for the acquisition of
colonies and aboriginal title. The defendants noted that the Baker Lake area had origi-
nally been part of Rupert's Land, which had been granted to the Hudson's Bay Company.
They argued that since Rupert's Land had been a settled colony, rather than a conquered
or ceded colony, there was no presumption (as there would be with a conquered
or ceded colony) that the laws and rights of the original inhabitants remained in force
after the settlement. Mahoney J. agreed that Rupert's Land had been a settled colony
(supra note 1, at 532 (F.C.), 25 (C.N.L.R.)), but noted that the distinction between
settled and conquered or ceded colonies had not been articulated in a reported case until
1693, and said that in its early development the distinction was not applied to the resolu-
tion of disputes involving the indigeneous population (op cit., at 532 (F.C.), 26
(C.N.L.R.)). Rather than pursuing these points, Mahoney J. then indicated (op cit., at
557 (F.C.), 45 (C.N.L.R.)) that the settled colony argument had been rendered un-
tenable by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Calder, supra note 9. An exami-
nation of Johnson reveals that Chief Justice Marshall had to do a lot of improvising to
apply the settled conquered colonies distinction to the situation of the Thirteen Colonies
in North America. As Slattery points out in The Land Rights of Indigeneous Canadian
Peoples as Affected by the Crowin's Acquisition of their Territories (Oxford: unpub-
lished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford Univ., 1979) at 27, the classical distinction (as articulated
in Blankard v. Galdy (1693), 2 Salk. 411, 4 Mod. Rep. 215, 90 E.R. 1089) failed to
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branches of government; 24 principles of international law;-2 5 or analogies to
common law concepts, such as prescription,
-2 0 adverse possession,27 licences, 28
or profits a prendre?
29
If aboriginal rights are to be cognizable in the courts of law, there must
be some means of proving their existence to the courts of law in the first
place. Drawing on a variety of earlier decisions,30 Mahoney J. set down the
following requirements for proof of aboriginal title:
1. That they [the plaintiffs, the Inuit] and their ancestors were members
of an organized society.
2. That the organized society occupied the specific territory over which
they assert the aboriginal title.
provide for the situation of settlement of already inhabited lands. See the more flexible
modern version of the distinction articulated in Freeman v. Fairlie (1828), 1 Moore
Ind. App. 306 at 325; 16 E.R. 117 at 128.
24 The defendants in Baker Lake also argued that there is no aboriginal title unless
it has been recognized by statute or prerogative act of the Crown or by treaty having
statutory effect, but Mahoney J. said that the Calder decision rendered this argument
untenable too, (supra note 1, at 557 (F.C.), 45 (C.N.L.R.)). See Hall J.'s arguments
against this requirement of government recognition in Calder, supra note 9, at 390-93,
404-406 (S.C.R.), 200-202, 210-11 (D.L.R.), 61-64, 73-74 (W.W.R.) (in the latter
pages Hall J. argued that the Act of State doctrine of international law had no applica-
tion to the situation in the Calder case). On the other hand, if government recognition is
not a sine qua non of aboriginal title, can it serve as an indication of the existence of
aboriginal title? To what extent if at all, e.g., do the following instruments of govern-
ment constitute recognitions of the existence of aboriginal title: Article 40 of the Articles
of Capitulation of Quebec in 1760? the Royal Proclamation of 1763? the Canadian
Indian land cession treaties? the documents initiating and implementing the transfer of
Rupert's Land and the North-western Territory into Canada in 1870? (on the former,
see Baker Lake, supra note 1, at 565-66 (F.C.), 52 (C.N.L.R.)).
25 See, e.g., the "discovery" doctrine articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Johnson, supra note 15, at 572-89 (Wheat.), 252-60 (U.S.), a doctrine that restricted
the scope of aboriginal title at the same time as it recognized the title.
20Although Hall J. declined to classify aboriginal title as a prescriptive right in
Calder, supra note 9, at 353 (S.C.R.), 174 (D.L.R.), 30 (W.W.R.) (because of the lack
of a prior right), it might be argued that a rough analogy can be drawn between aborigi-
nal title and prescription, nevertheless.
27 If prior use for a sufficiently long time can give rise to a claim that the common
law, will recognize as prior to that of most or all others, then aboriginal people who can
show occupation and use from time immemorial may be in a position to argue for
analogous treatment. It should be noted here that analogies to prescription or adverse
possession could prove to be double-edged swords: they could work against as well as
for aboriginal peoples in cases where others used aboriginal peoples' lands for long
periods of time.
28 Like a licence, the Indian interest described in the St. Catherine's Milling case,
supra note 14, at 54 (App. Cas.), 118 (Cart. B.N.A.) is apparently revocable at will,
"dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign." Unlike a bare or simple licence, the
interest would appear to be an interest in land: see text accompanying notes 53-56, infra.
29 See, e.g., R. v. Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 at 469, 9 A.P.R. 460 at 469
(N.S.C.A.).
30 Including Calder, supra note 9; Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, 75
D.L.R. (3d) 434, 34 C.C.C. (2d) 377; Johnson, supra note 15; Worcester, supra note
15; Re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211 at 233 (P.C.); and U.S. v. Santa Fe R.R.,
314 U.S. 339, 62 S. Ct. 248, 86 L. Ed. 60 (1941).
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3. That the occupation was to the exclusion of other organized societies.
4. That the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty
was asserted by England. 31
Mahoney J. was under no illusions that the requirements would be easy
to apply. Documentation of aboriginal title brings the court into a realm
where written records are rare, where judges must rely on anthropological,
historical and archaeological evidence, and make judgments of a subjective
nature. Acknowledging these difficulties in the case at hand,32 Mahoney J.
was nevertheless able to conclude that on the balance of probabilities the
Inuit had established an aboriginal title to all the Baker Lake area except a
portion of the south-west corner, which he said appeared to have been occu-
pied primarily by Indian people, not Inuit, on the advent of English sover-
eignty.Z3 It is interesting to speculate on what the result would have been had
Mahoney J. found that Indians and Inuit had used this corner roughly equal-
ly: would the "exclusivity" requirement have negated both titles, or would it
have been relaxed to allow recognition of a joint title held by each?
Had the Inuit title been extinguished? Here Mahoney J. was faced with
an apparently divided view from the Supreme Court of Canada on the proper
test for legislative extinguishment of aboriginal title. The plaintiffs, relying
on the judgment of Hall J. in Calder, argued that to extinguish aboriginal
title legislation must contain express words stating this object.34 The defend-
ants, relying on the judgment of Judson J. in Calder, argued that extinguish-
ment could occur as a necessary result of legislation, even where no such
intention was expressed in it.35
Mahoney J. disagreed with the contention that Hall J. had gone so far as
to say that Parliament must state its intention to extinguish explicitly in the
statute itself. He said that this requirement would be contrary to the basic
principle that:
Once a statute has been validly enacted, it must be given effect. If its necessary
effect is to abridge or entirely abrogate a common law right, then that is the effect
that the courts must give it. That is as true of an aboriginal title as of any other
common law right.36
The true test, concluded Mahoney J., is whether or not the legislator
31 Supra note 1, at 557-58 (F.C.), 45 (C.N.L.R.).
3 21d. at 562-63 (F.C.), 49-50 (C.N.L.R.). Note Mahoney J.'s flexible approach to
interpreting the first requirement at 558 (F.C.), 46-47 (C.N.L.R.).
33 Id. at 562-63 (F.C.), 49-50 (C.N.L.R.).
34 Id. at 566 (F.C.), 53 (C.N.L.R.).
35 Id. It should be noted that this was Mahoney J.'s understanding of the thrust of
the defendants' contention.
0 Id. at 568 (F.C.), 55 (C.N.L.R.). Mahoney I. traced the "clear and plain" inten-
tion requirement used by Hall J. in Calder to Santa Fe R.R., supra note 30, at 353-54
(U.S.), 255 (S. Ct.), 273-74 (L. Ed.), where Douglas J. said that in view of a statutory
indication to the contrary, extinguishment could not be "lightly implied" (i.e., it could
be implied in a sufficiently compelling case). Mahoney J. noted that no Canadian legisla-
tion requiring that legislative extinguishment of aboriginal titles had been brought to
his attention, and that numerous Canadian authorities (including Sikyea v. The Queen,
[1964] S.C.R. 642, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 80, 49 W.W.R. 306, delivered by Hall J. for the
Court) had held that the right to hunt, even when confirmed by treaty, is subject to
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has expressed a clear and plain intention to extinguish the aboriginal title.3 7
In his view, the legislation by the Parliament of Canada since 1870 had not
expressed such an intention in relation to the aboriginal title of the Inuit.
Examining the charter granting Rupert's Land (of which the Baker Lake area
is now a part) to the Hudson's Bay Company in 1670 and to the order in
council admitting Rupert's Land to Canada in 1870, Mahoney J. found that
there had been no intention to extinguish the aboriginal title.38 Since there
had been no surrender of the title either, the title continued.
Whether, as Mahoney J. suggested, the "clear and plain intention" test
was effectively the test of both Hall and Judson JJ. in Calder, or whether it
represents a compromise between the tests of these two judges, it is not with-
out merit. If aboriginal title is to be a concept cognizable generally at com-
mon law, then it must be subject to the same general limitations as are other
common law rights, and one of these limitations is subordination to statute by
virtue of the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. On the other hand, the
requirement of a clear and plain intention to extinguish aboriginal title raises
a form of presumption against extinguishment that should provide at least
some protection against cases of "extinguishment by oversight."
Can the rights enjoyed pursuant to aboriginal title be abridged? This
question had already been answered for Mahoney J. by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Derriksan v. The Queen39 and Kruger v. The
Queen.40 Mahoney J. summarized the answer as follows: "There can, how-
ever, be no doubt as to the effect of competent legislation and that, to the
extent that it does diminish the rights comprised in an aboriginal title, it
prevails."
'41
In the view of Mahoney J., extinguishment can be effected only by the
Parliament of Canada,42 whereas abridgment may be possible by other legis-
regulation by competent legislation. Mahoney J. noted that s. 1 (a) of the Canadian Bill
of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III, did not make the aboriginal title in issue in Baker Lake
an exception to the general rule that courts must give effect to legislation even when its
necessary effect is to abridge or entirely abrogate common law rights.
37 Supra note 1, at 569 (F.C.), 56 (C.N.L.R.).
38 Mahoney J. examined the provisions of the Charter and of the Order in Council
before adopting the "clear and plain intention" test. In Mahoney J.'s examination of these
provisions, the implication seems to be that there is no need at this point to consider
whether something like the "clear and plain intention" test of extinguishment is neces-
sary, because a simple interpretation of the Charter and Order in Council makes it clear
(in the view of Mahoney J.) that extinguishment is not intended. Mahoney J. felt that
the Charter did not extinguish the aboriginal rights of the Inuit because the Charter gave
the Hudson's Bay Company a notional title to the land that, like that of the Crown itself,
could co-exist with the Inuit title, and because the Charter did not purport to interfere or
authorize the Company to interfere with the Inuit laws.
39 (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 150, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 480, 31 C.C.C. (2d) 575 (S.C.C.).
4 o Supra note 30.
41 Supra note 1, at 576 (F.C.), 61-62 (C.N.L.R.).
42 Id. at 574 (F.C.), 60 (C.N.L.R.). It is suggested that Mahoney J. is correct on
this point: apply the rule in Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1916] A.C.
566 at 580, 10 W.W.R. 391 at 398 (P.C.) to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction con-
ferred by s. 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, and see
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latures or through delegated legislation.43 In the case at hand, Mahoney J.
held that to the extent that the aboriginal rights of the Inuit had been abridged
by federal mining legislation, this abridgment was not invalid.
44
As with extinguishment, it is difficult to argue with a legal capacity con-
ferred pursuant to the Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine, assuming the ab-
sence of impediments in the written part of our constitution. Nevertheless, it
would seem inconsistent if on one hand the law imposed special requirements
before permitting extinguishment by Parliament, while on the other hand it
permitted all legislatures to override aboriginal rights at will by way of
abridgment.
Apart from the fact that an abridged right, unlike an extinguished right,
presumably "revives" once the offending legislation is repealed or amended,
the present law appears to contain no definite limit to the extent of possible
federal abridgement. Provincial abridgement is subject to two additional con-
straints, although they are indirect in nature. Provincial abridgment is invalid
if it constitutes legislation directed at Indians or lands reserved for the In-
dians,45 or if it is found to have the effect of paralyzing the status and
capacities of Indians.
4"
the St. Catherine's Milling case, supra note 14; and A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. [1910] A.C.
537 at 644, 645-46, 1 Olmstead 567 at 574, 575-76 (P.C.).
43 Supra note 1, at 574 (F.C.), 60 (C.N.L.R.). Mahoney J.'s source for this state-
ment is presumably the decision in Kruger, supra note 30, in which the Supreme Court
of Canada upheld the British Columbia Wildlife Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433, on the
ground that it was a law of general application and was valid either as a provincial law
in its own right, or as a provincial law that had been referentially incorporated as federal
legislation by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, notwithstanding
the fact that the British Columbia statute may have restricted aboriginal hunting rights
claimed on behalf of Kruger.
44 Id. at 576 (F.C.), 61-62 (C.N.L.R.). Because of the approach he took on this
question, Mahoney J. avoided having to reach a definite overall conclusion regarding the
degree of abridgment which had in fact taken place. Mahoney J. did say that the inter-
mittent passage of low-flying aircraft constituted a serious harassment of the caribou in
individual cases and could frustrate a hunter should it occur in the course of a hunt (op.
cit., at 546-47 (F.C.), 35-36 (C.N.L.R.)). On the other hand, he found no evidence that
the caribou were severely harassed by round-the-clock diamond drilling, exploration
camps, marker ribbons, or high-flying aircraft. The generally inconclusive nature of tho
evidence and of the findings is reflected in the following passages.
Mahoney J. said:
While the overall caribou population of the Baker Lake Area appears to have de-
clined and the ability of the Baker Lake hunters to satisfy their needs from that
population has undoubtedly been impaired, the balance of probabilities, on the
evidence, is that activities associated with mineral exploration are not a significant
factor in the population decline. Clearly, there have been a number of instances
where low flying aircraft employed in those activities have interfered with particu-
lar hunters.
Op. cit. at 548 (F.C.), 36 (C.N.L.R.). Later, Mahoney J. noted that: "Two or three
witnessed incidents [of harassment] may well reflect a reality of countless unwitnessed
incidents." Op. cit. at 555 (F.C.), 43 (C.N.L.R.).
-5This is a constitutional restriction to which all provincial legislation is subject:
see, e.g., Cardinal v. A.G. Alta., [1974] S.C.R. 695 at 703, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 553 at 559-
60, 13 C.C.C. (2d) 1 at 7.
46 In Kruger, supra note 30, at 110 (S.C.R.), 438 (D.L.R.), 381 (C.C.C.), Dickson
J. said that:
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It might be asked whether the existing common law constraints on abridg-
ment are adequate. Thought might be given in a subsequent case to articulat-
ing a simple presumption against abridgment. Such a presumption would
involve no challenge to Parliamentary sovereignty; it would apply to com-
munal rights a well-established common law tradition used to safeguard rights
considered important to individuals. It would provide some balance to the
presumption already in place in regard to extinguishment. 47
Because extinguishment had not taken place in the Baker Lake case, the
question of the extent to which there is a presumption in favour of compen-
sation in cases of extinguishment 48 did not arise. Moreover, because the
plaintiffs in Baker Lake had not sought compensation, Mahoney J. considered
the fact that a law may have graver consequences to one person than to another
does not, on that account alone, make the law other than one of general applica-
tion. There are few laws which have a uniform impact. The line is crossed, how-
ever, when an enactment, though in relation to another matter, by its effect,
impairs the status or capacity of a particular group. The analogy may be made to
a law which in its effect paralyzes the status and capacity of a federal company.
•.. such an act is no 'law of general application'....
Similarly, at 112 (S.C.R.), 440 (D.L.R.), 382-83 (C.C.C.), Dickson J. states: "It would
have to be shown that the policy of such an Act was to impair the status and capacities
of Indians. Were that so, s. 88 would not operate to make the Act applicable to Indians."
What Dickson J. has done here, it is suggested, is apply the doctrine of intrajurisdictional
immunity (discussed in Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977)
at 83-84, 92-95, 355-64, 387n. 27) to s. 91(24) of the British North America Act. For
a different view of the meaning of the paragraph from which the second passage cited
above is taken, see Jordan, Government, Two-Indians, One (1978), 16 Osgoode Hall L.J.
709 at 722.
47 While such a presumption would be unlikely to have much effect in the case of
relatively unequivocal statutory prohibitions such as those found in the Derrikson and
Kruger cases, it could have considerable room to operate in determining the scope of
activity permissible under legislation granting rights to third parties on land subject to
aboriginal title. In a general situation like that in Baker Lake, e.g., the presumption
could operate so as to exclude excessive harassment of caribou from the range of activity
deemed permissible in the government mining exploration permits. On the facts in Baker
Lake itself, Mahoney J. appears to have found the evidence of serious harassment to be
inconclusive overall but it is possible to conceive of other circumstances in which serious
harassment could be clearly shown and documented: see supra note 44.
4 8 In Canada, although many statutes provide for compensation for expropriation
of property, there is no general constitutional right to compensation where property has
been taken (contrary to the situation in the United States by virtue of the last part of
the Fifth Amendment to the American constitution; although in regard to constitutional
compensation for expropriation of Indian title in the United States, see Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 222, 75 S. Ct. 313, 99 L. Ed. 314 (1955)). Nor does the
"due process" provision of the Canadian Bill of Rights guarantee such compensation:
see Nat'l. Capital Comm'n. v. Lapointe, [1972] F.C. 568 at 571, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 376 at
379 (F.C.T.D.). In Calder, Judson J. implies that the Tee-Hit-Ton rule should apply in
Canada but fails to mention any common law presumption in favour of compensation:
supra note 9, at 344 (S.C.R.), 167-68 (D.L.R.), 23-26 (W.W.R.). Hall J., on the other
hand, states the presumption in language which in some places ("the expropriation of
private rights by the government under the prerogative necessitates the payment of com-
pensation... ." (op. cit., at 352 (S.C.R.), 173 (D.L.R.), 30 (W.W.R.)) may appear to
suggest that it is something more than a mere presumption. Overall, it is suggested that
although there is a common law presumption in favour of compensation that likely ex-
tends to aboriginal title, its precise application to aboriginal title remains uncertain in
the wake of Calder.
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it unnecessary to determine if any abridgment which may have occurred was
compensable. 49 Apart from a suggestion in Kruger that many kinds of abridg-
ment of private rights are not compensable,50 the question of whether there
is a presumption in favour of compensation in cases of abridgment of ab-
original title remains unexplored.
In the course of his judgment, Mahoney J. made a number of comments
about the content and character of aboriginal title that reflect earlier judicial
statements on this topic.5' He made the common sense observation that the
incidents of aboriginal title which will be given effect at common law are
those that were traditionally exercised by the aboriginal people.r 2
Toward the end of the judgment, Mahoney J. suggested that the ab-
original title arising from the Royal Proclamation is not a proprietary right, 9
giving as his source the judgment of Lord Watson in the St. Catherine's Mill-
ing case.54 If what is understood by "proprietary" interest is an interest in
land, then it is difficult to agree that Lord Watson found that this right is not
proprietary in nature.5 5 Referring in this case to the territory ceded by the
Salteaux tribe of Objibbeway Indians, Lord Watson said that: "The ceded
territory was at the time of the union, land vested in the Crown, subject to
'an interest other than that of the Province in the same', within the meaning
of sec. 109 .. ..-56 The words "the same" here refer to "land," and the in-
terest in the land "other than that of the Province" to which Lord Watson
refers is the Indian interest.
Whether aboriginal title is a proprietary interest in the sense of an in-
terest in land could have a bearing on how and whether the courts will decide
49 Supra note 1, at 576 (F.C.), 61 (C.N.L.R.).
50 "Most legislation imposing negative prohibitions affects previously enjoyed rights
in ways not deemed compensatory": Kruger, supra note 30, 108 (S.C.R.), 437 (D.L.R.),
380 (C.C.C.).
51 In the opinion of Mahoney J. these rights were communal rights (see supra note
1, at 565 (F.C.), 52 (C.N.L.R.). Cf. Amodu Ti!ani v. Southern Nigeria, [1921] 2 A.C,
399 at 403-404 (P.C.); Re Paulette and Register of Titles (No. 2) (1974), 42 D.L.R.
(3d) 8 at 27 (N.W.T.S.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 63 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (N.W.T.C.A.),
aff'd on other grounds, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628); that they could co-exist with a national
title such as that of the Crown (op. cit., at 565 (F.C.), 52 (C.N.L.R.); cf. the St.
Catherine's case, supra note 14, at 55 (App. Cas.), 119 (Cart. B.N.A.)), but not with
the interest of an ordinary private estate holder (op. cit., at 565 (F.C.), 52 (C.N.L.R.)).
In the case of the Baker Lake Inuit they comprised the specific rights of occupancy,
hunting and fishing (op. cit., at 563 (F.C.), 50 (C.N.L.R.)).
52 Supra note 1, at 559 (F.C.), 46-47 (C.N.L.R.), basing this on Amnodu Tilani, id.
53 1d. at 577 (F.C.), 62-63 (C.N.L.R.).
54 Mahoney J. referred to the St. Catherine's decision, supra note 14, at 54 ff. (App,
Cas.), 118 ff. (Cart. B.N.A.).
55 Lord Watson did say (id. at 54 (F.C.), 118 (Cart. B.N.A.)) that the Indians'
tenure was "a personal and usufructuary right," but it has been decided since (in A.G.
Que. v. A.G. Can., [1921] A.C. 401 at 410-11, 56 D.L.R. 373 at 378-79 (P.C.)) that
"personal" in this passage meant that the Indian interest could be alienated only to the
Crown.
50 Supra note 14, at 58 (App. Cas.), 121 (Cart. B.N.A.).
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that aboriginal rights can be enforced against third parties infringing them
without express statutory authority to do so.
This question was also of direct relevance in the Baker Lake case itself.
Section 8 of the Territorial Lands Act provides that: "The Governor in
Council may make regulations for the leasing of mining regulations in, under
or upon territorial lands and the payment of royalties therefor, but such regu-
lations shall provide for the protection of and compensation to the holders
of surface rights."57 Had it been decided that the Inuit aboriginal title con-
stituted an interest in land, the Inuit would have been "holders of surface
rights" within the meaning of the section, and might well have succeeded in
their action for a declaration that the mining regulations pursuant to this
section of the Territorial Lands Act did not apply.
In summary, it may be that the Baker Lake decision overemphasizes the
recognition given in Calder to the concept of an aboriginal title independent
of the Royal Proclamation. Had it not done so, the decision might have
attempted the "first principles" analysis of the legal basis of aboriginal rights
so long overdue in this area of law. Although it may not have made a differ-
ence in the fact situation in Baker Lake, some form of presumption against
abridgment would seem desirable. In regard to the legal character of aborigi-
nal title, it is difficult to agree that Proclamation-based aboriginal title is not
proprietary in character.
On the other hand, the Baker Lake decision rightly confirms that the
Inuit are heirs to the general tradition of Indian aboriginal title. The decision
supports the concept of an aboriginal title cognizable generally in law, not
dependent on the geographical and semantic uncertainties of the Royal Proc-
lamation. It synthesizes existing judicial requirements for the proof of ab-
original title. It offers a reconciliation of the apparently contradictory posi-
tions on extinguishment in Calder.
In Baker Lake, Mahoney J. has recognized in aboriginal title a full com-
mon law right, with the advantages and disadvantages that notion implies. In
the process, he has made a significant contribution to clarifying the aboriginal
title concept. Much more remains to be done, however, particularly to ensure
that the title can provide effective legal safeguards for the people who claim
it. The concerns that led to the Baker Lake case still exist, and are likely to
grow with each passing year.
57 R.S.C. 1970, c. T-6.
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